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The Case of Two-Mind
Syndrome
Magda Osman1,*
The reference to the word ‘mythical’ by
Melnikoff and Bargh [1] is apt because, as
they point out, humans have an uncanny
need to understand things in binary form.
It functions as an ideal that is rarely an
accurate reﬂection of reality. The pro-
found attraction to it has helped psychol-
ogists to discover that cognition
conveniently reduces to two modes,
one fast one not, one accessible one
not, one biased one not, one controllable
one not, etc. But could it be that we
psychologists have a chronic case of
two-mind syndrome (a collection of sci-
entiﬁc efforts that are designed to main-
tain a claim about the binary functioning of
the mind despite signiﬁcant evidence to
the contrary)?
There have been other persuasive voices
signalling a similar warning that the duality
of the mind is not literal: ‘This book [Think-
ing, Fast and Slow] has described the
workings of the mind as an uneasy inter-
action between two ﬁctional characters:
the automatic System 1 and the effortful
System 2. You are quite familiar with the
personalities of the two systems and able
to anticipate how they might respond in
different situations. And of course you
remember that the two systems do not
really exist in the brain or anywhere else’
([2], see p. 415).
Besides the warnings, and even in light of
amassing contrary evidence, as Melnikoff
and Bargh [1] show, the spread of the
dual-system framework covers most
areas of psychology, reaching pandemic
proportions. It may even be responsible
for psychology’s current attention and
credibility that has seen it courted by gov-
ernments across the world, albeit under
the more acceptable label of behavioural
science. The public and private sector’s
use of the dual-system framework as an
explanatory tool of the mind is so
embedded that there is no scepticism.
The lack of it is preventing any discussion
of the serious implications in the applied
world of using a ﬂawed framework of the
mind. What happens when that frame-
work is still being used to guide public
policy interventions (Box 1)? This issue
is further reinforced by public uptake of
the dual-system framework. Even when
evidence suggests they are implausible, if
they are sticky enough psychological
phenomena that enter public awareness
are monumentally difﬁculty to shift. Take,
for instance, subliminal advertising. The
public still believe it to be a tool for uncon-
sciously inﬂuencing our purchasing
behaviour [7,8], but this is based on a
falsehood that is of staggering propor-
tions by virtue of its popularity as an idea
[9]. Vicary never conducted the now infa-
mous 1957 cinema experiment in which
cinema goers were subliminally ﬂashed
‘eat popcorn’ and ‘drink Coca-Cola’
and so never possessed data showing
increases of sales of both. Yet, Vicary
popularised the power of applying psy-
chology to manipulate behaviour by tar-
geting the unconscious. From then until
now the idea has stuck regardless of the
lack of any reliable evidence that sublimi-
nal advertising works [9,10].
As the authors mentioned [1], there have
been compelling challenges to this
Box 1. The Illusionary Panacea for Social Ills
In the psychology of persuasion, the application of psychological research in government used to target
human limitations dates back to Lippmann’s work in the 1920 [3]. A modern incarnation of this, in the form of
the nudge programme, was born in 2008 [4] and is a collection of decision-support techniques that
capitalises on psychological insights to improve people’s lifestyle choices.
In the academic world, the problem with the programme is that it has come unstuck. Without a good theory
that speciﬁes the mechanisms that underpin behaviour, it lacks a principled scientiﬁc way of determining
why it fails when it does, which it does [5], and what it needs to do to reliably improve [6].
Beyond academia, in the media the limitations of the programme, exposed through scientiﬁc interrogation,
have had a muted voice. Yet the proponents of nudge have done little to dispel the public and private
sectors’ perceptions of it as a panacea for societal problems. This is a repeating pattern in the history of
research on persuasion. Each development in the model of behaviour is believed, by practitioners, to have
the potential to generate reliable and sustainable behavioural change at a population level, but has never
succeeded in delivering.
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framework for over 30 years. In their own
particular formulation of the two-mind
syndrome, the authors remind us of an
important objection to the dual-system
approach, which is that there has been
no empirical test of the alignment of pro-
cesses that are described as co-occur-
ring in most dualist typologies. The
authors already show in their review of
the evidence that the alignment of proc-
essing characteristics (e.g., unconscious,
uncontrollable, unintentional, inefﬁcient)
does not bear out according to a typical
dualist account. It is worth noting that if
the dual process enthusiasts wanted to
mount a defence along the same lines as
they have done previously, they could
argue that the typology varies by the type
of dual-system theory that exists, of which
there are many, none of which reduces to
a single agreed typology [11]. However,
one might wonder how convincing a
defence is, that makes a virtue of a failing
in coherence across different theoretical
variants of the same underpinning theo-
retical framework.
In any case, what is the outcome of yet
another elegant and convincing disman-
tling of the dual-system typology? Given
the diagnosis, it seems that we the psy-
chology community are chronically suffer-
ing from two-mind syndrome. This means
we still cannot quite face up to the weight
of conceptual challenges, and evidence
showing that our popular dual-system
formulation of the mind is not scientiﬁcally
warranted. The problem is that being in
the grip of this syndrome has an impact
on those around us (i.e., public, industry,
government). We have a scientiﬁc
responsibility to communicate the chal-
lenges to grand ideas, even if we are
not ready to accept them ourselves. An
approach of this kind helps to promote
healthy scepticism in society [12], while
maintaining faith in the institution of sci-
entiﬁc progress through discovery, which
depends on the push and pull between
ideas.
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Until recently, many psychologists
were skeptical that young children
cared about reputation. New evi-
dence suggests that by age ﬁve,
children begin to understand the
broad importance of reputation
and to engage in surprisingly
sophisticated impression
management. These ﬁndings
prompt exciting new questions
about the development of a funda-
mental social competency.
Most of us intuitively understand the
importance of reputation. We know that
the way others view us constrains our
ability to succeed, and we work hard to
present ourselves favorably [1]. We also
recognize that reputational incentives
tempt others to behave dishonestly,
and we tend to dislike braggarts and dis-
honest self-promoters (e.g., [2]). For psy-
chologists, reputation management and
evaluation in adults have long been topics
of interest [1,2]. Less attention has been
paid, however, to the emergence of rep-
utational cognition in young children. Until
recently, many were skeptical that com-
plex reputational behavior could emerge
before age nine (e.g., [3]). However,
recent developmental studies tell a differ-
ent story. According to these new ﬁnd-
ings, children’s understanding of
reputation expands rapidly at around
age ﬁve, when children begin to track
and manage the impressions they convey
and recognize reputational motives and
behaviors in others. Here, we review a
number of these results, and we discuss
how they expand our understanding of
reputation management and open impor-
tant avenues for future research.
Around age ﬁve, children begin to recog-
nize that their actions can signal important
information about their desirability to
potential social partners, and they will vary
their behavior based on audience and
social context. Indeed, 5-year-old chil-
dren are consistently more generous
when they know they are being observed
[4]. Furthermore, they appear to signal
selectively, looking to cultivate positive
impressions with key individuals in their
social groups. In one recent experiment,
young children behaved more generously
when they were observed by a potential
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